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ENUMERATED MEANS AND 
UNLIMITED ENDS 
H. Jefferson Powell* 
United States v. Lopez1 can be read as a fairly mundane disa-
greement over the application of a long-settled test. The Govern-
ment defended the statute under review in the case, the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990,2 along familiar lines as a permissible reg-
ulation of activity affecting interstate and foreign commerce. The 
Solicitor General reasoned that the Act's prohibition on the posses-
sion of firearms in local school zones was a rational means of limit-
ing the incidence and effects of violent crime, and the prevention of 
violent crime was a rational means of protecting "the functioning of 
the national economy" from various negative effects.3 Agreeing 
with the Government, Justice Breyer argued in his dissent that 
"[n]umerous reports and studies ... make clear that Congress could 
reasonably have found the empirical connection [between 'gun-
related school violence and interstate commerce'] that its law, im-
plicitly or expressly, asserts."4 The Lopez majority, however, found 
that there was no basis on which to conclude that the activity pro-
hibited by the Act "substantially affects" interstate commerce5 and 
accordingly held that the Act "exceeds the authority of Congress 
'[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States.' "6 
On this reading of Lopez, its main point of interest lies in the 
fact that, for the first time since the New Deal, the Supreme Court 
has found that a congressional statute flunks its Commerce Clause 
test. In and of itself, though, that fact is little more than a curiosity, 
and, as a practical matter, the main effect of Lopez is very likely to 
be nothing more than a renewed congressional interest in loading 
federal criminal statutes with findings and "jurisdictional ele-
* Professor of Law & Divinity, Duke Law School. B.A. 1975, Univ. of Wales; A.M. 
1977, Duke; M. Div. 1979, J.D. 1982, Yale; Ph.D. 1991, Duke. - Ed. I thank Gerry Spann 
for his generous and very helpful comments and Lillian Powell for her invaluable support. 
1. 115 s. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
2. 18 u.s.c. § 922(q) (1994). 
3. See 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (summarizing the Government's argument). 
4. 115 S. Ct. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
5. See 115 S. Ct. at 1630, 1634. 
6. 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (quoting U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). 
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ment[ s ]"7 in order to demonstrate the close link between what Con-
gress wishes to regulate and "Commerce . . . among the several 
States."8 Lopez, in short, may have little effect on the post-1937 
norm of congressional omnicompetence.9 
In this essay, I do not address the question whether Lopez was 
an important decision. My concern instead is with the problem that 
underlies Lopez's particular issue of the scope of the commerce 
power: Given our commitment to limited national government, in 
what way is the national legislature actually limited? Or, more ex-
actly, how are we to approach the task of constitutional interpreta-
tion so as to give appropriate meaning and effect to our 
commitment to limited national government? Many Supreme 
Court decisions, of course, pose this question in one fashion or an-
other, but Lopez particularly invites reflection. The specific issue 
before the Court - the interpretation of Congress's enumerated 
powers - is our oldest vehicle for debating the problem of giving 
meaning to national limitation, and all the opinions in Lopez reflect 
a serious attempt to wrestle with its implications and resolution.lo 
At the same time, the sharp divisions among the Justices in Lopezll 
7. See 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (discussing the significance of the fact that the Act contained "no 
jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm 
possession in question affects interstate commerce"). 
8. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
9. In his dissent, which shrewdly analogizes the majority's reasoning to pre-1937 substan-
tive due process, Justice Souter suggests that this may in fact be all there is to the decision. 
See 115 S. Ct. at 1657 ("[T]oday's decision may be seen as only a misstep, its reasoning and its 
suggestions not quite in gear with the prevailing standard ..•• "). For reasons somewhat 
similar to those I present in this article, Souter raises doubts about his own suggestion: "Not 
every epochal case," he reminds the reader, "has come in epochal trappings." 115 S. Ct. at 
1657 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, at least, clearly sees Lopez as the beginning of 
something much bigger, but his opinion was not joined by any of his colleagues. See 115 S. 
Ct. at 1642-43, 1650-51 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
10. In doing so, the opinions canvas the original meaning of "Commerce," see 115 S. Ct. 
at 1643-46 (Thomas, J., concurring), the history of the Court's interpretation of the Com-
merce Clause, see 115 S. Ct. at 1627-29; 115 S. Ct. at 1634-37 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 115 S. 
Ct. at 1648-49 (Thomas, J., concurring); 115 S. Ct. at 1652-53 (Souter, J., dissenting), the 
nature and application of modem Commerce Clause case law, see 115 S. Ct. at 1629-34; 115 
S. Ct. at 1649-50 (Thomas, J., concurring); 115 S. Ct. at 1653-57 (Souter, J., dissenting); 115 S. 
Ct. at 1657-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting), and the correct reading of Gibbons v. Ogden, see 115 S. 
Ct. at 1626-27; 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 115 S. Ct. at 1646-48 (Thomas, J., 
concurring); 115 S. Ct. at 1657, 1665 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
11. The Lopez Justices often sharply disagree about the conclusions to draw from the 
sources of constitutional interpretation they invoke. Justice Breyer, for example, believes 
that the dissenters' position rests on a view of the Commerce Clause stemming from Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 115 S. Ct. at 1665 (Breyer, J., dissenting), while Justice Thomas insists that "Gib-
bons simply cannot be construed as the principal dissent would have it," 115 S. Ct. at 1648 
(Thomas, J., concurring). The fact that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor plainly disagree with 
Justice Thomas about the implications of Gibbons complicates the picture stili further. Com-
pare 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring) (Gibbons recog-
nized that "the Commerce Clause grants Congress extensive power and ample discretion to 
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demonstrate that despite its fundamental character, the problem of 
how to construe the Constitution so as to limit the national govern-
ment remains uncertain more than two centuries after its 
ratification. 
My purpose is to compare one of the approaches to the problem 
of limited national government offered in Lopez, that of the major-
ity opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, with early 
attempts to address the same issue. Chief Justice Rehnquist's rea-
soning, I argue, closely resembles the constitutional logic developed 
by early Republican theorists such as Madison for the express pur-
pose of preserving the Constitution's commitment to limited na-
tional power.12 At the same time, however, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, like - virtually13 - everyone who has sat on the 
Supreme Court since the 1930s, believes that the range of Con-
gress's legitimate concerns is as broad as "the common Defence and 
general Welfare,"14 a position that is expressly contrary to, and fun-
damentally subversive of, the early Republican logic. After this 
comparison, I then examine the approaches to constitutional inter-
pretation articulated by early constitutionalists who shared Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's profound nationalism as to the ends Congress 
may pursue. In the conclusion, I reflect on the relative merits of the 
Republican and nationalist positions as models for contemporary 
constitutional interpretation. Many of us, including Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, believe that Congress may employ its limited powers to 
address the essentially unlimited goals of the national welfare. If 
we agree with the early nationalists to that extent, I suggest, a deci-
sion such as Lopez may be a questionable judicial intervention into 
determine its appropriate exercise") with 115 S. Ct. at 1648 (Thomas, J., concurring) (refer-
ring to "Gibbons's emphatic statements that Congress could not regulate many matters that 
affect commerce"). 
12. I want to note at the outset that Chief Justice Rehnquist undoubtedly views a much 
wider range of legislation as within the scope of the commerce power than would have oc-
curred naturally to early constitutionalists. As the Chief Justice notes, the New Deal expan-
sion of the authority accorded Congress under the Commerce Clause is "[i]n part . . . a 
recognition of the great changes that had occurred in the way business was carried on in this 
country." 115 S. Ct. at 1628; see also 115 S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring). While this 
is troublesome to some, see 115 S. Ct. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the 
problems with "interjecting a modem sense of commerce into the Constitution"), for the 
purposes of this essay I want to put the issue to one side. 
13. It would be unnecessary to add this qualification if it were not for Justice Thomas's 
concurring opinion in Lopez, which suggests that his view of congressional power may be 
narrower than that espoused by any Supreme Court Justice since the Court unanimously 
adopted Hamilton's view of the spending power in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
See, e.g., 115 S. Ct. at 1650 n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing a possible willingness "to 
return to [his own view of] the original understanding"). The many interesting questions 
Justice Thomas's concurrence raises are beyond the scope of this essay. 
14. U.S. CoNST. art I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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legislative discretion rather than an appropriate defense of the con-
cept of limited federal government. 
I. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S APPROACH TO THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning is elegant and in its own 
terms irrefutable.15 He "start[ s] with first principles, "16 principles 
that he clearly deems first both as a matter of logic and as a matter 
of history. 
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated pow-
ers. See U.S. Canst., Art. I, § 8. As James Madison wrote, "[t]he 
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal govern-
ment are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefi.nite."17 
The act of specifying the powers to be delegated to Congress neces-
sarily assumes the existence of unspecified and thus undelegated 
powers. As Chief Justice John Marshall wrote of the commerce 
power in Gibbons v. Ogden, 18 "The enumeration presupposes 
something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the 
language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively in-
ternal commerce of a State."19 Congressional powers are enumer-
ated powers; the enumeration of some powers implies the existence 
of powers not enumerated: from these two premises, the Lopez 
majority draws two inferences. First, the commerce power - and 
one would assume all congressional powers, but we must return to 
that issue later- "is subject to outer limits."20 Second, the outer 
limits on the commerce power are judicially enforceable.21 
15. I would reach the same conclusion about the principal dissent, written by Justice 
Breyer, which convincingly demonstrates that, on an ordinary application of the Court's 
decades-old Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the statute at issue in Lopez is plainly constitu-
tional. See 115 S. Ct. at 1657-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The disagreement between the ma-
jority and the dissenters in Lopez is the product of a fundamental disagreement over how the 
Court should approach the task of reviewing the constitutionality of congressional statutes. 
The separate opinions of Justices Kennedy and Souter directly address this disagreement 
over the judicial role. See 115 S. Ct. at 1634-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 115 S. Ct. at 1651-
57 (Souter, J., dissenting). The purpose of this essay is to explore the same fundamental 
disagreement from a different perspective, that of early constitutional history. 
16. 115 S. Ct. at 1626. 
11- 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (citing THE FEDERAUST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Ciin· 
ton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
19. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195, quoted in Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627. 
20. 115 S. Ct. at 1628; see also 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]here are 
real limits to federal power."). 
21. See 115 S. Ct. at 1633 (referring to "judicially enforceable outer limits"); see also 115 
S. Ct. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (referring to "our duty to recognize meaningful limits 
on the commerce power of Congress"). The Lopez majority does not explain its rejection of 
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Neither of these steps in the Chief Justice's argument is surpris-
ing nor do the dissenters challenge them. The crucial step in the 
Chief Justice's logic, and the point at which he and the dissenters 
part company, lies in a further inference that Chief Justice Rehn-
quist clearly draws but nowhere directly states. For the Court to 
uphold a supposed exertion of the commerce power, the Chief Jus-
tice believes that the Court must be able to assure itself that in do-
ing so it has not foreclosed the possibility of invalidating any other 
federal acts with the same analysis. That is to say, if the argument 
that must be made to justify a particular statute leaves one unable 
to hypothesize any piece of legislation that Congress could not law-
fully enact under tlie same reasoning, the argument and the statute 
stand self-condemned as invalid attempts to ignore the principle of 
enumerated and limited federal power.22 
This last step in the Chief Justice's logic made virtually ines-
capable his conclusion that the Gun-Free School Zones Act is un-
constitutional. Neither the Government nor the dissent identified 
any specific federal legislation that would fall outside the commerce 
power as they interpret it, and rightly so in Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's view, for their reasoning did not in fact preserve any discern-
ible area of legislation that the commerce power could not reach.23 
the view that it is Congress rather than the courts that is charged with enforcing limitations 
on federal power that stem from the enumeration of powers. The Court came close to adopt-
ing that position in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528,548 
(1985), with respect to federalism issues. The only members of the Lopez majority then on 
the Court, Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, dissented. 
22. The opinion of the Court repeatedly refers to the unwillingness of the Government 
and the dissenters to identify specific legislation as beyond the scope of the commerce power 
in order to demonstrate the incompatibility of their position with the principle of enumer-
ated, limited, and judicially policed federal powers. See 115 S. a. at 1628-29 ("[T]he ... 
commerce power ' ... may not be extended so as to ... create a completely centralized 
government.'") (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)); 115 
S. a. at 1632 ("Under the theories that the Government presents ... it is difficult to perceive 
any limitation on federal power . . . . Although Justice Breyer argues that acceptance of the 
Government's rationales would not authorize a general federal police power, he is unable to 
identify any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not."); cf. 115 S. a. at 
1633 (noting that uncertainty about the validity of commerce power legislation is unavoida-
ble "so long as Congress' authority is limited to those powers enumerated in the Constitu-
tion, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable 
outer limits"); 115 S. Ct. at 1649 (Thomas, J., concurring) (commenting on the failure of the 
Government and of the dissenters to specify "any limits to the Commerce Clause"). 
23. See 115 S. a. at 1632. 
We pause to consider the implications of the Government's arguments. The Govern-
ment admits, under its "costs of crime" reasoning, that Congress could regulate not only 
all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how 
tenuously they relate to interstate commerce. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Similarly, under 
the Government's "national productivity" reasoning, Congress could regulate any activ-
ity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family 
law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example. Under the theories 
that the Government presents in support of§ 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limita-
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"To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to 
pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to 
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a 
general police power of the sort retained by the States. "24 
It is important to be clear about what Chief Justice Rehnquist is 
implying about the proper approach to construing congressional 
powers. In effect, Lopez suggests that it is not enough to make the 
positive argument that a given statute has a substantial relationship 
to interstate commerce; it is also necessary to make the essentially 
negative demonstration that one can with logical consistency prove 
some other, hypothetical statute unconstitutional.25 This second, 
negative requirement - what we might call "the test of conse-
quences" - serves to confirm that, in upholding the use of the 
Commerce Clause under review, the Court is not inadvertently 
"conclud[ing] that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does 
not presuppose something not enumerated" contrary to the princi-
ple of enumerated and therefore limited federal power.26 
In itself, the Chief Justice's adoption of the test of consequences 
for demonstrating that a statute lies within the commerce power 
seems to me entirely sensible. In good common law fashion, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist is proposing that we test an argument for a pro-
posed answer to an uncertain question by its compatibility with pro-
positions of law we know to be true.27 We know from the principles 
of enumeration and limitation that there must be something Con-
gress cannot do. If the consequence of a constitutional argument is 
that we cannot imagine anything that would be beyond Congress's 
power under it, that is a powerful indication that the argument is 
mistaken. More broadly, the test of consequences evidences the 
Chief Justice's allegiance to the widely held view that the signifi-
cance of judicial review lies in the actual or potential invalidation of 
governmental action. 
The opinion of the Court in Lopez evidences Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's concern about preserving the principles of enumera-
tion on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education 
where States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the Govern-
ment's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Con-
gress is without power to regulate. 
115 S. Ct. at 1632. 
24. 115 S. Ct. at 1634. 
25. Presumably neither the Court nor the Government would attempt to make such a 
showing with respect to an actual statute that had not been invalidated already. 
26. 115 S. Ct. at 1634. 
27. For purposes of this essay, it seems to me unimportant whether propositions of law 
can ever be "true" other than in the sense that they are generally accepted. 
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tion and limitation. But United States v. Lopez is not the only opin-
ion Chief Justice Rehnquist has written that implicates those 
principles. The Chief Justice is also the author of South Dakota v. 
Dole,28 the leading modem case on the scope of Congress's power 
to spend money. In Dole, he briskly rejected the argument that the 
spending power is limited in its goals to the ends embodied in the 
enumeration of particular congressional powers in Article I, Section 
8.29 Instead, according to Dole, Congress may expend funds for any 
purpose that serves the "general Welfare," subject to certain very 
general doctrinal standards that do not appear to have any great 
limiting effect on the scope of the spending power as a practical 
matter.30 Dole included no parallel to the test of consequences in 
Lopez: the Government was not required to point out specific ex-
penditures of money that would transcend the bounds of the spend-
ing power in order to show that the use of the power at issue in 
Dole was legitimate. After Lopez, we know that the commerce 
power and thus Congress's legislative competence in fact remain 
limited: there is at least one piece of legislation - the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990- that is beyond the scope of the power. 
After Dole, in contrast, we do not know if there is any legislation 
involving the expenditure of federal funds that is outside the scope 
of the spending power. This power, in fact, may be infinite - to be 
sure, as long as Congress can accomplish its goal through 
expenditure. 
On a purely doctrinal level, Dole and Lopez are of course easily 
reconcilable: the statute Dole upheld was a straightforward exer-
cise of the power to spend that the Court could not deem outside 
the scope of the "general Welfare," while the statute Lopez struck 
down was not, the Court concluded, a regulation of anything that 
could be seen as "Commerce ... among the several States." I do 
not mean to suggest that the Chief Justice has been inconsistent in 
any straightforward sense. My interest in comparing the two deci-
sions lies in the tension between them that emerges when one re-
flects on them in light of early constitutional debates over the 
proper construction of Congress's powers. As I mentioned above,31 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in Lopez closely resembles the 
28. 483 u.s. 203 (1987). 
29. See 483 U.S. at 207. 
30. See 483 U.S. at 207-08; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL 
LAw 322-23 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing "the absence of effective limits [on the spending power] 
derived from the general welfare clause itself"). 
31. See supra note 12 and accompanying text 
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approach to congressional power that James Madison and his polit-
ical allies developed in the first decade or so after ratification. But 
Dole expressly endorsed a central proposition of the early national-
ist opponents of Madison - that Congress is not limited in its goals 
by the Constitution's enumeration of its powers. Nor is this a pecu-
liarity of Dole or of the spending power: nothing in his opinion in 
Lopez suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist has any qualms about 
Congress's use of any of its powers as instruments to achieve ends 
that are not themselves encompassed within those powers.Jz On 
the question of what goals Congress may pursue, in other words, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist is the heir of the early nationalists not of 
Madison. 
II. THE MADISONIAN APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION OF 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER 
The majority opinion in United States v. Lopez begins its analy-
sis with the well-known passage from The Federalist No. 45 in which 
Madison contrasts the powers which the Constitution would accord 
the federal government - "few and defined" - with the "numer-
ous and indefinite" powers that would remain with the states.33 For 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's purposes, however, he also might have 
quoted Madison's famous speech against the national bank bill, de-
livered in the House of Representatives in February 1791.34 That 
speech, far more clearly than Madison's general statement in The 
Federalist No. 45, employs an approach to the interpretation of con-
gressional powers that closely parallels Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
own in Lopez. Madison began his attack on the bank bill by noting 
"the peculiar manner in which the Federal Government is limited. 
It is not a general grant out of which particular powers are excepted 
- it is a grant of particular powers only, leaving the general mass in 
other hands."3s With this fact in mind, Madison described the first 
rule of "right interpretation" in terms of the consequences of a pro-
posed argument: "An interpretation that destroys the very charac-
32. Once again, I intend no criticism. It would have been remarkable if Dole had come to 
the opposite conclusion. It has been settled law at least since Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 
321 (1903), that Congress may employ its enumerated powers to accomplish ends that are 
incidental to the inherent purpose of the enumerated powers themselves. In United States v. 
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), the Court confirmed that this conclusion applied to the spending 
power as well, even as the Court struck down an exertion of the spending power on federal· 
ism grounds. 
33. See 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (quoting THE FEDERAUST No. 45, supra note 17, at 292-93). 
34. See James Madison, Speech on the Bank Bill (1791), reprinted in 13 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADisoN 372 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981). 
35. 13 Id. at 374. 
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teristic of the Government cannot be just. "36 If a proposed 
congressional action cannot be defended except through an argu-
ment that subverts "[t]he essential characteristic of the government 
as composed of limited and enumerated powers" by leaving nothing 
clearly beyond congressional reach, the argument must be errone-
ous and the action unconstitutional.37 The bank bill, in Madison's 
view, failed this test by necessarily resting on arguments that gave 
"an unlimited discretion to Congress" to legislate.38 
Later in the speech, Madison invited his audience to test the 
argument for the bank bill with reasoning parallel to the Lopez test 
of consequences and to Chief Justice Rehnquist's objection to 
"pil[ing] inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair 
to convert congressional authority ... to a general police power of 
the sort retained by the States."39 
Mark the reasoning on which the validity of the bill depends. To 
borrow money is made the end and the accumulation of capitals, im-
plied as the means. The accumulation of capitals is then the end, and 
a bank implied as the means. The bank is then the end, and a charter 
of incorporation, a monopoly, capital punishments, &c., implied as 
the means. 
If implications, thus remote and thus multiplied, can be linked to-
gether, a chain may be formed that will reach every object of legisla-
tion, every object within the whole compass of political economy.40 
If the bank bill were deemed constitutional, Madison could imagine 
no legislation that would be beyond Congress's authority. That 
consequence alone, because it would "destroy[] the very character-
istic of the government," proved the bill invalid.41 
Madison's insistence that any congressional action be brought to 
the test of its consequences for the principle of enumerated and 
limited federal power became at once a standard and central fea-
ture of constitutional argument among the opponents of the activist 
central government advocated by Hamilton and other nationalists. 
A few examples will suffice. Advising President Washington to 
36. 13 Id. 
37. 13 Id. at 376. 
38. 13 Id. (speaking with specific reference to the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
39. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995). 
40. Madison, supra note 34, at 377-78 (emphasis omitted). The constitutional reasoning 
necessary to sustain the bank bill, Madison pointed out, would enable Congress to do any-
thing that would serve "the general wealth of the society [and thus] the general prosperity of 
agriculture, manufactures, and commerce." 13 Id. at 377; cf. 115 S. a. at 1633 (rejecting the 
Government's "national productivity" argument for the Gun-Free School Zones Act). 
41. Madison, supra note 34, at 374. Madison had other arguments against the bank bill 
too. See 13 id. at 372-82 for a summary of his views from which the phrase quoted in the text 
is taken. 
660 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:651 
veto the bank bill after Congress passed it over Madison's objec-
tions, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson criticized the arguments 
in the bill's favor as implicitly leaving no legislative power beyond 
Congress's reach. If the unenumerated power to incorporate a 
bank were a legitimate means of executing the power to collect 
taxes, Jefferson wrote, the same reasoning "will go to every 
[unenumerated power], for there is not one which ingenuity may 
not torture into a convenience in some instance or other, to some 
one of so long a list of enumerated powers."42 The consequence of 
accepting the argument for the bank, in other words, would be "to 
take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible 
of any definition"43 and thus overthrow the constitutional intent to 
"lace [Congress] up straitly within the enumerated powers, and 
those without which, as means, these powers could not be carried 
into effect. "44 
When the bank's 1791 charter was presented to Congress for 
renewal in 1811, Representative Peter Porter took the lead in at-
tacking its validity.45 Porter restated the fundamental principle that 
"[t]he Constitution has expressly given to Congress the power to do 
certain things; and it has, as explicitly, withheld from them the 
power to do every other thing."46 But the justifications of the bank 
bill directly violated this principle by implying that Congress could 
legislate across the range of what Madison had called "political 
economy." Porter pointed to the implications of the argument that 
"the right to incorporate a bank is implied in the power to regulate 
trade and intercourse between the several States."47 
It is said to be so, inasmuch as it creates a paper currency, which fur-
nishes a convenient and common circulating medium of trade be-
tween the several States. Money, sir, has nothing more to do with 
trade, than that it furnishes a medium or representative of the value 
of the articles employed in trade. The only office of bank bills is to 
42. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a Na-
tional Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER 41, 43 (1991), 
43. Id. at 42. 
44. Id. at 43. 
45. Porter was more successful in 1811 than Madison had been in 1791: the 1811 renewal 
bill died in the Senate when the Vice President exercised his power to break a tie by voting 
against the bill, on expressly constitutional grounds. 
By 1811, Madison himself had concluded that renewal or reenactment of the Bank Act 
would be constitutional, although on the ground of precedent rather than as a matter of the 
proper interpretation of the Constitution's text. See, e.g., Letter of James Madison to Charles 
Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in THE MIND oF THE FoUNDER 390-93 (Marvin Meyers rev. 
ed. 1981). 
46. 22 ANNALS OF CoNG. 636 (1811). 
47. 22 Id. at 636-37. 
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represent money. Now, if it be a regulation of trade, to create the 
representative articles or subjects of trade, a fortior~ will it be a regu-
lation of trade to create the representative articles or subjects them-
selves. By this reasoning then you may justify the right of Congress to 
establish manufacturing and agricultural companies within the several 
States; because the direct object and effect of these would be, to in-
crease manufactures and agricultural products, which are the known 
and common subjects of trade.48 
Madison himself returned to the theme in 1817, when as his last act 
as President he vetoed an internal improvements bill that he sup-
ported as a matter of policy. As he explained in his veto message, 
"no adequate landmarks would be left by the constructive exten-
sion of the powers of Congress as proposed in the bill":49 it would 
be impossible thereafter to identify legal limits on the exercise of 
congressional powers. 
Madison and his allies thus anticipated the Lopez test of conse-
quences, and, to that extent, they and Chief Justice Rehnquist share 
a common approach to the task of preserving the principle of enu-
merated and limited national powers. For the Madisonians, how-
ever, the test of consequences and their rejection of interpretation 
by "piling inference upon inference"50 were linked inextricably with 
their view of the goals Congress was authorized to pursue. Not 
only Congress's means but also its ends had to be construed as lim-
ited by the enumeration of powers. To do otherwise, they believed, 
would be to subvert, just as surely, the limiting purpose of enumera-
tion. This point emerges most clearly and most frequently in their 
discussion of the scope of the spending power - the very power 
that Dole explicitly held not to be limited in purpose by the princi-
ple of enumeration. Madison addressed the issue in 1791: "No ar-
gument could be drawn from the terms 'common defence and 
general welfare.' The power as to these general purposes, was lim-
ited to acts laying taxes for them; and the general purposes them-
selves were limited and explained by the particular enumeration 
subjoined. "51 
48. 22 /d. at 637. 
49. James Madison, Message to the U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 3, 1817), in 
PowELL, supra note 42, at 314. 
50. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. a. 1624, 1634 (1995). 
51. Madison, supra note 34, at 375. 
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Madison reiterated this view at significant length in his Report 
of 1800, which defended the Virginia legislature's 1798 resolutions 
denouncing the Alien52 and Sedition Acts53 as unconstitutional. 
Now whether the phrases in question be construed to authorise 
every measure relating to the common defence and general welfare, 
as contended by some; or every measure only in which there might be 
an application of money, as suggested by the caution of others, the 
effect must substantially be the same, in destroying the import and 
force of the particular enumeration of powers, which follow these 
general phrases in the Constitution. For it is evident that there is not 
a single power whatever, which may not have some reference to the 
common defence, or the general welfare; nor a power of any magni-
tude which in its exercise does not involve or admit an application of 
money. The government therefore which possesses power in either 
one or other of these extents, is a government without the limitations 
formed by a particular enumeration of powers ... ,54 
Later Madisonians repeated this reasoning. Arguing against the 
constitutionality of an internal improvements bill in 1818, Repre-
sentative Alexander Smyth insisted that the breadth of congres-
sional goals was no broader under the spending power than under 
any other power. "The common defence and general welfare are to 
be provided for, by expending the money raised in the execution of 
the other powers expressly granted. If Congress have greater lati-
tude in making appropriations than in passing other laws, it is not 
given to them by the Constitution."ss 
52. Act Concerning Aliens, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired in 1800 by its own terms). 
53. Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, 1 Stat. 596 
(1798) (expired in 1801 by its own terms). 
54. James Madison, Report of 1800 (1799), reprinted in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADrsoN 314-15 (David B. Mettern ed., 1991). See the entire passage, 17 id. at 313-15. 
Madison consistently maintained this view throughout his public career. In vetoing the 1817 
internal improvements bill, he wrote that "the terms 'common defence and general welfare,' 
embrac[e] every object and act within the purview of a legislative trust," Madison, supra note 
49, at 313, and for that reason their use in Article I, § 8 could not properly be construed as a 
direct delegation of power without "giving to Congress a general power of legislation instead 
of the defined and limited one hitherto understood to belong to them,'' id. But Madison was 
equally critical of the argument that, while Congress could not directly legislate for "the 
general welfare," it could employ its spending power across that indefinite range of legisla-
tive ends. 
A restriction of the power "to provide for the common defence and general welfare" 
to cases which are to be provided for by the expenditure of money would still leave 
within the legislative power of Congress all the great and most important measures of 
Government, money being the ordinary and necessary means of carrying them into 
execution. 
Id. at 314. 
55. 31 ANNALS oF CoNG. 1146 (1818). About the same time, Jefferson noted that the 
Republican "tenet" had always been that 
Congress had not unlimited powers to provide for the general welfare, but were re-
strained to those specifically enumerated; and that, as it was never meant they should 
provide for that welfare but by the exercise of the enumerated powers, so it could not 
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The Madisonians sometimes linked the necessity of limiting 
Congress's ends with the preservation of the role of judicial review 
in the constitutional order. Madison wrote in 1817 that if Congress 
could legislate for any legitimate purpose whatsoever, directly or 
through the spending power, the effect would be to "exclud[e] the 
judicial authority of the United States from its participation in 
guarding the boundary between the legislative powers of the Gen-
eral and the State Governments, inasmuch as questions relating to 
the general welfare, being questions of policy and expediency, are 
unsusceptible of judicial cognizance and decision."56 The following 
year, Alexander Smyth noted a different problem. If Congress 
treated the spending power as unlimited in its ends, judicial review 
would no longer play a significant role in maintaining limits on fed-
eral power because of the improbability of "the constitutionality of 
an appropriation law being brought before the judiciary."57 
Viewed from the perspective of James Madison and his constitu-
tional allies, Chief Justice Rehnquist's allegiance to the principle of 
enumerated and limited federal power is so imperfect as to be effec-
tively pointless. Lopez, it is true, subjects exercises of the com-
merce power to the test of consequences. But for the Madisonians, 
Dole, and more generally Chief Justice Rehnquist's acceptance of 
the modem consensus that Congress's ends are not limited by the 
Constitution, are as a practical matter just as destructive of the prin-
ciple of enumeration and limitation as is the interpretation by "pil-
ing inference upon inference" that the test of consequences is 
meant to check.ss As Madison explained, "there is not a single 
have been meant they should raise money for purposes which the enumeration did not 
place under their action .... 
Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June 16, 1817), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 90, 91 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899). 
56. Madison, supra note 49, at 313. In his cautious, private criticism of McCulloch v. 
Maryland, Madison made a related point. His concern, he explained, was that Marshall's 
opinion rendered it impossible for the Court to carry out its promise to invalidate legislation 
enacted "for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the Government." Letter of 
James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in THE MIND OF TIIE FoUNDER, supra note 
45, at 360-61. 
But suppose Congress should, as would doubtless happen, pass unconstitutional laws not 
to accomplish objects not specified in the Constitution, but the same laws as means expe-
dient, convenient or conducive to accomplishment of objects entrusted to the Govern-
ment; by what handle could the Court take hold of the case? ... Should Congress [pass 
such an act] as a means judged by them to be necessary, expedient or conducive to the 
borrowing of money, which is an object entrusted to them by the Constitution, it seems 
clear that the Court, adhering to its doctrine, could not interfere without stepping on 
Legislative ground, to do which they justly disclaim all pretension. 
I d. 
57. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1146 (1818). 
58. In 1817, Jefferson wrote that the Republican insistence on the limited scope of Con-
gress's legitimate goals was "almost the only landmark which now divides the federalists from 
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power whatever, which may not have some reference to the com-
mon defence, or the general welfare; nor a power of any magnitude 
which in its exercise does not involve or admit an application of 
money."59 In his view, therefore, a government with the power to 
spend for any purpose coming within the notion of the general wel-
fare "is a government without the limitations formed by a particular 
enumeration of powers. "60 
Modem Supreme Court Justices are not obliged, of course, to 
render their constitutional views consistent with those of any early 
constitutionalist, not even James Madison. But the stark inconsis-
tency, from a Madisonian perspective, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
approach to interpreting congressional powers suggests the value of 
looking to the Madisonians' opponents to examine the way or ways 
in which they reconciled a rejection of the enumeration of powers 
as a limit on Congress's purposes with the common constitutional 
commitment to the principle of enumerated and limited powers. 
III. THE EARLY NATIONALIST APPROACH TO THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 
Against the background of the long run of post-1937 decisions 
invariably upholding Commerce Clause legislation, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion in United States v. Lopez reads like a reaction 
to views expressed by the Court in earlier cases.61 Since the New 
Deal, an undiluted nationalism in the interpretation of congres-
sional authority has been the almost unbroken norm, and Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's arguments on behalf of placing some limits on that 
nationalism have up to now been the exception.62 In the founding 
era, however, as a rhetorical matter the situation was the reverse, 
and early nationalist views were crafted in response to Madisonian 
attacks on proposed congressional legislation, beginning with the 
the republicans." Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, supra note 55, at 90. In 
Jefferson's political lexicon, "federalist" and "republican" were virtually synonymous with 
"subverter of" and "upholder of the Constitution's limitation of national authority." Cf. 
Madison, supra note 54, at 335 ("[I]t must be wholly immaterial, whether unlimited powers 
be exercised under the name of unlimited powers, or be exercised under the name of unlim-
ited means of carrying into execution, limited powers."). See generally 10 id. at 334-35. 
59. Madison, supra note 54, at 314. 
60. 17 Id. at 315. 
61. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (declining "to proceed 
any further" with the expansion of congressional power suggested by "some of our prior 
cases"). 
62. For his most notable earlier attempt, see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding particular Commerce Clause legislation to be an uncon-
stitutional invasion of state sovereignty}, overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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debate over the 1791 bank bill. The early nationalists differed 
among themselves over the proper approach to interpreting Con-
gress's powers, but they did share two fundamental positions: they 
disagreed with the Madisonian test of consequences and its associ-
ated rejection of inferential argument, and they maintained that 
Congress may legislate to accomplish any legitimate governmental 
purpose and not merely those ends that might be viewed as embod-
ied in Article I, Section 8's enumeration of powers.63 
One day after Madison delivered his great speech against the 
bank bill, the brilliant, if eccentric, Fisher Ames rose to reply. Con-
gress's power to exercise powers not expressly delegated by the 
Constitution "has long been a bugbear to a great many worthy per-
sons," Ames conceded, because "[t]hey apprehend that Congress, 
by putting constructions upon the Constitution, will govern by its 
own arbitrary discretion. "64 However respectable the group pos-
sessed by such fears, Ames dismissed the view as based on an unex-
amined and insupportable presumption that there is something 
inherently questionable about the exercise of national power.65 
The powers of Congress are disputed. We are obliged to decide 
the question according to truth. The negative, if false, is less safe than 
the affirmative, if true. Why, then, shall we be told that the negative 
is the safe side? Not exercising the powers we have, may be as perni-
cious as usurping those we have not.66 
Ames rejected Madison's approach to construing federal power 
as a risible attempt to reduce great questions of public good to law-
yers' quibbles: the latter's "rules of iD.terpretation ... only set up 
one construction against another" without rendering the public any 
63. The distinguished constitutional historian G. Edward White has questioned the utility 
of applying the term "nationalist" to the Marshall Court on the ground that the "national-
ism" of John Marshall and his colleagues was not a commitment to an activist central govern-
ment of the 20th-century variety but focused instead on the preservation of the Union against 
the centrifugal forces of regionalism and states' rights. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MAR-
SHALL CoURT AND CuLTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 1-2 (1988). One might generalize the 
point to suggest that no early constitutionalist foresaw or would have countenanced the mod-
em federal administrative state that contemporary constitutional nationalists defend. In one 
sense, that is self-evidently true, but little follows from it for present purposes. By "early 
nationalists," I intend to refer to the contemporaries of the Madisonians who rejected the test 
of consequences and refused to limit Congress to the ends enumerated in Article I, § 8's 
delegation of powers. Whether any particular early nationalist would have changed his mind 
if shown what the 20th century would do with his reasoning is unanswerable. On the possibil-
ity that, even in his own day, Chief Justice Marshall was less nationalist than some of his 
fellow Federalists, see PoWELL, supra note 42, at 173-77. 
64. 2 WoRKS OF FISHER AMES 853 (W.B. Allen ed., Liberty Classics 1983) (1854). 
65. Ames also argued that most of Congress's legislation in the first two years of its exist-
ence was questionable if Madison's arguments were correct. 2 ld. at 853-54. 
66. 2 Id. at 854-55. 
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safer.67 He denounced Madison's test of consequences as creating a 
pointless ground of objection to legislation that passed the substan-
tive test of conformity to the public good.68 
This was not to say, of course, that there were no limits on what 
Congress could do but only that the limits stemmed from the posi-
tive purposes for which the Constitution created the federal govern-
ment. According to Ames, an exercise of congressional power that 
in fact serves the public good and does so without violating express 
constitutional limits or the principles of individual liberty accorded 
with the Constitution's purposes and was therefore valid: "Con-
gress may do what is necessary to the end for which the Constitu-
tion was adopted, provided it is not repugnant to the natural rights 
of man, or to those which they have expressly reserved to them-
selves, or to the powers which are assigned to the states."69 Legisla-
tion that serves a purpose legitimate for government to pursue -
that "promotes the good of the society" without violating "natural 
rights"70 - is constitutional for Congress to enact unless the consti-
tutional text expressly prohibits it. 
The author of the bank bill was Secretary of the Treasury 
Alexander Hamilton, and President Washington can have had little 
doubt as to the Treasury Secretary's ultimate conclusion when he 
asked Hamilton, Secretary Jefferson, and Attorney General 
Edmund Randolph71 to advise him on the bill's constitutionality. 
Hamilton's defense of the bill's validity agreed in essentials with 
Ames's argument, although his opinion was a tightly argued, point-
by-point refutation of Jefferson and Randolph that reads quite dif-
ferently than the report of Ames's often sarcastic and sometimes 
florid speech. Hamilton characterized the question of Congress's 
67. 2 Id. at 854. 
68. "[T]he proof of the affinnative imposed a sufficient burden, as it is easier to raise 
objections than to remove them." 2 Id. at 855. 
69. 2 Id. at 856. A few moments later, in restating his approach to interpreting congres-
sional power, Ames made it clear that by "necessary" he did not mean to imply any tight 
limit on the relationship between constitutional ends and congressional means. "That con-
struction may be maintained to be a safe one which promotes the good of the society, and the 
ends for which the government was adopted, without impairing the rights of any man, or the 
powers of any state." 2 Id. 
70. 2 Id. 
71. In an interesting opinion, Randolph endorsed Hamilton's broad view of the ends 
Congress may seek, while agreeing with Jefferson that the bank bill was unconstitutional. 
Randolph's fundamental concern with the bill was that he agreed with Madison that the 
arguments necessary to justify it could equally apply to sustain anything. See Walter 
Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The Attorney Gen-
eral's First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DuKE L.J. 110, 118-20 (1994). 
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legitimate ends in terms of the sovereign character of congressional 
power. 
[E]very power vested in a Government is in its nature sovereign, and 
includes by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite, 
and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power; and 
which are not precluded by restrictions & exceptions specified in the 
constitution; or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of 
political society.72 
This summary of Hamilton's reasoning parallels the passage from 
Ames quoted in the preceding paragraph except that it leaves it 
unclear whether the powers actually "vested in [the Federal] Gov-
ernment" are broad enough to encompass all of "the essential ends 
of political society." 
The rest of Hamilton's bank opinion made it clear that he did 
not disagree materially with Ames's view of the unlimited nature of 
Congress's proper aims. All powers vested in Congress, Hamilton 
wrote, "especially those which concern the general administration 
of the affairs of a country, its finances, trade, defence &c ought to 
be construed liberally, in advancement of the public good" in order 
that "national exigencies [may] be provided for, national inconve-
niences obviated, [and] national prosperity promoted."73 Further-
more, Hamilton rejected any claim that the Constitution vested in 
Congress only "express" powers and "implied" means for the exe-
cution of express powers: "[T]here is another class of powers, 
which may be properly denominated resulting powers ... [which 
are] a result from the whole mass of the powers of the government 
& from the nature of political society, [rather] than a consequence 
of either of the powers specially enumerated."74 
With respect to the spending power, Hamilton rejected any sub-
stantive limitation on the objects for which the spending power 
could be employed, the only qualification on Congress's choice of 
ends being that it "cannot rightfully apply the money they raise to 
72. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act 
to Establish a Bank {1791), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 98 
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965). Hamilton asserted that once this proposition was recognized to 
be true, the bank bill's validity might be taken to be established "as far as concerns the 
reasonings of the Secretary of State & the Attorney General" because, as Hamilton read 
them, their "reasonings" stood or fell on the cogency of their claim that Congress had no 
power whatever to charter a corporation. 8 Id. at 97-99. 
73. 8 I d. at 105. Like Ames, Hamilton criticized the Madisonian position for its underly-
ing assumption that denying Congress power is safer than recognizing it. "The greater dan-
ger of error" in admitting the existence of national rather than state power, Hamilton wrote, 
"as far as it is supposeable, may be a prudential reason for caution in practice, but it cannot 
-be a rule of restrictive interpretation." 8 I d. 
74. 8 Id. at 100. 
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any purpose merely or purely local. But with this exception they 
have as large a discretion in relation to the application of money as 
any legislature whatever."75 In his Report on the Subject of Manu-
factures of the following December, Hamilton reasoned that by ex-
tending the spending power to all matters of the "general Welfare," 
the Constitution had entrusted Congress with authority over a "vast 
variety of particulars, which are susceptible neither of specification 
nor of definition."76 He added that "there seems to be no room for 
a doubt that whatever concerns the general Interests of learning of 
Agriculture of Manufactures and of Commerce are within the 
sphere of the national Councils as far as regards an application of 
Money."77 
With sufficient determination, one might discern some marginal 
differences between Ames's and Hamilton's approach to interpret-
ing congressional powers. In reality, however, their views were sub-
stantially identical.78 In evaluating the validity of congressional 
legislation, they agreed, "[t]he only question must be, in this as in 
every other case, whether the mean to be employed ... has a natu-
ral relation to any of the acknowledged objects or lawful ends of the 
government."79 If so and if the legislation is neither textually pro-
hibited nor "immoral,"80 they agreed that it was within Congress's 
powers. In particular, Hamilton, like Ames, rejected any argument 
that federal legislation justified under his affirmative test should be 
subjected to an additional test of consequences.s1 
75. 8 Id. at 129. Hamilton thought the question whether an expenditure of money was 
genuinely for the general, as opposed to local, welfare "must be matter of conscientious dis-
cretion" for Congress. 8 Id. 
76. Alexander Hamilton, Fmal Version of the Report on the Subject of the Manufactures 
(Dec. 5, 1791), in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 72, at 230, 303. 
77. 10 Id. Like the bank opinion, the Report on Manufactures asserted that the question 
whether an expenditure is in fact for the general welfare is "of necessity left to the discretion 
of the National Legislature." 10 Id. Madison's Report of 1800 quoted this passage from the 
Report on Manufactures as one of its primary examples of the Federalist "design" to interpret 
Congress's powers "so as to destroy the effect of the particular enumeration of powers by 
which it explains and limits them." Madison, supra note 54, at 314. 
78. At least rhetorically, Hamilton appeared to require legislation based on a power 
other than the spending power to be directed toward an end "clearly comprehended within 
any of the specified powers." Hamilton, supra note 72, at 107. But Hamilton's understand-
ing of the powers delegated to Congress was so broad that it is difficult to view this require-
ment as of much practical significance, and, indeed, neither the early nationalists nor their 
Madisonian critics appear to have discerned any important difference between Ames and 
Hamilton. 
79. 8 Id. at 100. 
80. See 8 id. at 98. I take Hamilton's reference to immorality to be parallel to Ames's 
reference to "the natural rights of man." 2 WoRKS OF FISHER AMES, supra note 64, at 856. 
81. "It is no valid objection to the doctrine to say, that it is calculated to extend the 
powers of the general government throughout the entire sphere of State legislation. The 
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Ames and Hamilton were creators and primary exemplars of 
1790s nationalist thought. They squarely rejected Madisonian inter-
pretation in favor of an approach to congressional power that cotifi-
dently followed whatever chain of inferences could be drawn 
between federal legislation and the proper ends of national govern-
ment. Their descriptions of those ends make it difficult to imagine 
many areas of legitimate governmental involvement that would lie 
by definition outside Congress's purview,sz as long as congressional 
action avoided express constitutional limits such as Article I, Sec-
tion 9 and the somewhat shadowy constraints of "natural rights" 
and "morality." The logical endpoint of the 1790s nationalist 
approach to congressional power can be found in Alexander 
Addison's critique of Madison's Report of 1800, which bluntly 
stated that the Constitution "gives to Congress power over the 
means, and imposes the duty of providing for the general welfare in 
all cases whatever, to which in its discretion the means ought to be 
applied."83 · 
Early nationalist thought was refurbished after the War of 1812 
by the congressional leadership of the Republican party which, 
freed from electoral fear of the Federalists and schooled by the War 
in the dangers of national weakness, attempted to synthesize Madis-
onian and nationalist themes. Arguing in support of the 1818 inter-
nal improvements bill, the Republican leaders redefined the point 
of both Madisonian and early nationalist interpretation as the pro-
tection of individual freedom. Speaker of the House Henry Clay 
asserted that a nationalist endorsement of "that vigor which is nee-
same thing has been said, and may be said with regard to every exercise of power by implica-
tion or construction." Hamilton, supra note 72, at 106. 
82. Hamilton's 1791 example of legislation outside congressional competence actually 
reenforces this conclusion. Hamilton informed Washington that "a corporation may not be 
erected by congress, for superintending the police of the city of Philadelphia because they are 
not authorized to regulate the police of that city." 8 I d. at 100. He went on at once, however, 
to assert that 
one may be erected in relation to the collection of the taxes, or to the trade with foreign 
countries, or to the trade between the States .•. because it is the province of the federal 
government to regulate those objects & because it is incident to a general sovereign or 
legislative power to regulate a thing, to employ all the means which relate to its regula-
tion to the best & greatest advantage. 
8 !d. at 100-01. It is difficult to see why, on this formulation of the constitutional test, Con-
gress should be unable to create a corporate body to superintend "the police [public order] of 
the city of Philadelphia" if it concluded that regulation of Philadelphia's public order was 
related to the protection of interstate or foreign trade. Perhaps Hamilton would have re-
jected such an argument on federalism or other grounds, but his basic approach to the inter-
pretation of congressional powers would seem to give him no basis to object that such a 
statute simply lay outside the scope of Congress's powers. 
83. Alexander Addison, Analysis of the Report of the Committee of the Virginia Assem-
bly (1800), in 2 AMERICAN PounCAL WRITING DuRING TilE FoUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at 
1066 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). 
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essary, in the exercise of [federal] powers" was essential to "fulfil 
the purposes" of the Constitution as "the sheet-anchor of the na-
tional safety,"84 while Representative Henry St. George Tucker as-
sured skeptics that support for the bill was compatible with the 
traditional Republican recognition of the Alien and Sedition Acts 
as paradigms of federal overreaching.ss The Constitution empow-
ered the national government to secure the public good, on the one 
hand, while it limited national power for the specific protection of 
individual liberty, on the other. This synthesis undoubtedly stressed 
libertarian motifs that were underdeveloped in 1790s nationalism, 
but its center of gravity lay in the original nationalist insistence that 
the primary reason for enumerating powers and vesting them in 
Congress was that they might be used for the common good. s6 
From the first responses to the Madisonian position forward, 
early nationalists insisted that the Madisonians had turned proper 
constitutional interpretation on its head.B7 Rather than viewing a 
limited set of legitimate ends as defining the outer bounds of con-
gressional authority, the early nationalists saw the indefinite range 
of legitimate governmental purposes suggested by the constitu-
tional references to "the common Defence and the general Wel-
fare" as identifying the positive bases for congressional action. In a 
subtle sense, constitutional interpretation, for Madison and his al-
lies, was a search for what Congress could not do; for the early na-
tionalists, it was an inquiry into what Congress could do. The 
nationalists rejected the Madisonian approach to interpretation 
with its test of consequences and its suspicion of "piling inference 
84. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1165 (1818). 
85. See 32 ANNALS OF CoNG. 1321 (1818). 
86. See the discussion of Republican nationalism in Charles Sellers's masterpiece on the 
Jacksonian era. CHARLEs SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICAN 
1815-1846, at 70-102,149-52 (1991). Speaker Clay's summary of his approach to interpreting 
congressional power is typical and revealing. 
In expounding the instrument ... constructions unfavorable to personal freedom, or 
those which might lead to great abuse, ought to be carefully avoided. But if, on the 
contrary, the construction insisted upon was, in all its effects and consequences, benefi-
cent; if it were free from the danger of abuse; if it promoted and advanced all the great 
objects which led to the confederacy; if it materially tended to effect the greatest of all 
those objects - the cementing of the Union, the construction was recommended by the 
most favorable considerations. 
31 ANNALS oF CoNG. 1165-66 (1818). Clay's concern with consequences is not the original 
Madisonian anxiety to preserve the essentially limited nature of federal power but a restate-
ment of the nationalist endorsement of the exercise of federal power to accomplish public 
good. 
87. Republican nationalists of the 1810s, to be sure, were careful not to criticize Madison 
directly. See, e.g., 31 ANNALS OF CoNG. 1165 (1818) (speech of Speaker Clay) (describing his 
"Constitutional opinions" as derived from Madison's Report of 1800 and other documents 
"of analogous principles"). 
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upon inference" because in their view those interpretive techniques 
assumed what the nationalists rejected, that the exercise of national 
power can be, in itself, a negative in the constitutional order. 
In what sense, then, did the early nationalists adhere to the prin-
ciple of enumerated and limited federal powers? In one way, the 
nationalists' commitment to the existence of limits on Congress was 
clear: from the beginning they conceded the legally binding nature 
of "restrictions & exceptions specified in the constitution."ss At the 
same time, however, they appear to have severed the connection 
between the enumeration of national power and its limitation that 
was the core of Madisonianism and that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
invokes in United States v. Lopez. The implication of our historical 
comparisons, to this point, calls into question the compatibility of 
the nationalist commitment to the proposition that Congress is not 
limited in its goals by the Constitution's enumeration of its powers 
with the Madisonian insistence that enumeration is limitation. 
IV. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF ENUMERATION 
One answer to the dilemma I have raised is simply to concede 
that the nationalist view of Congress's ends is as a practical matter 
inconsistent with respect for the principle of enumeration. If one 
admits unlimited ends even with respect to only a subset of Con-
gress's powers, such as the spending power, Congress has as a prac-
tical matter the means of addressing substantially any matter of 
legitimate governmental concern. From the standpoint of James 
Madison and his allies, it will then be "wholly immaterial"S9 that the 
interpreter is willing to insist that Congress follow one path toward 
omnicompetence rather than another. One might object to Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's Madisonian opinion in United States v. Lopez 
on the Madisonian ground that a decision whether to employ the 
commerce power or the spending power to achieve an end admitted 
to be within Congress's purview is a "question[ ] of policy and expe-
diency ... unsusceptible of judicial cognizance and decision."90 
There is, perhaps, another approach to this issue, one that I pro-
pose we consider as more appropriate to our own common under-
standing of the Constitution. Although the early nationalists 
rejected interpretive strategies such as the Madisonian test of con-
sequences that were intended to ensure ex ante that there were 
88. Hamilton, supra note 72, at 98. 
89. See Madison, supra note 54, at 335. 
90. Madison, supra note 49, at 317. 
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things Congress could not do, they nevertheless insisted that their 
position respected the principle of enumeration and, indeed, the 
proper connection between enumeration and limitation.9t In early 
nationalist thinking, the enumeration of congressional powers plays 
a meaningful role in limiting federal authority not by pointing to 
subjects with which Congress could not deal but by placing 
whatever Congress did do under the rule of law. The principle of 
enumeration renders it necessary in the American constitutional or-
der for the proponent of congressional action to produce "the proof 
of the affirmative,"92 to show that what Congress has or might do 
has an appropriate connection to the powers that the Constitution 
delegates to it. The existence of judicial review, furthermore, cre-
ates an institutional means by which individuals may require an in-
dependent tribunal to review that connection. As an early 
nationalist judge wrote, "A comparison of the law with the constitu-
tion is the right of the citizen."93 It is in this sense that the enumer-
ation of national powers limits national powers: for any exercise of 
national authority to be legitimate, it must be possible to demon-
strate its basis in the powers the Constitution grants according to 
the existing standards and doctrines of constitutional interpretation. 
Federal power is limited because it must be valid and capable of 
being validated. Judicial review of congressional legislation for its 
conformity to Article I, Section 8 is meaningful not because of hy-
pothetical statutes the courts could strike down, but because in as-
suring the polity of the connection between Congress's powers and 
Congress's actions, the courts display the "authority of constitutions 
over governments"94 in the American constitutional order. 
None of this is to say that a court should not invalidate a federal 
statute if, on examination, it determines that the statute does not 
have the connection to Congress's enumerated powers our devel-
oped constitutional tradition requires. I do not even argue that the 
majority was in error in United States v. Lopez, although shorn of 
the test of consequences, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion does 
91. In 1791, Ames rejected the "misconception of his argument" as a claim "for an arbi-
trary, unlimited discretion in the government to do every thing." 2 WoRKS OF FISHER AMES, 
supra note 64, at 859. "[Ames] had noticed the great marks by which the construction of the 
Constitution, he conceived, must be guided and limited; and these, if not absolutely certain, 
were very far from being arbitrary or unsafe." 2 I d. The reader will recall that those "great 
marks" were "the good of the society, and the ends for which the government was adopted," 
"the natural rights of man," and express constitutional reservations of rights or power to the 
people or the states. 2 Id. at 856; see supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text. 
92. 2 WoRKS OF FISHER AMES, supra note 64, at 855. 
93. United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 615 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700). 
94. Madison, supra note 54, at 312. 
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seem to me less persuasive than Justice Breyer's dissent. This es-
say's conclusion is a suggestion about method, not outcome. In a 
world in which the nationalist principle that Congress's ends are not 
circumscribed by its enumerated powers is common ground, inter-
pretive strategies such as the test of consequences are inappropri-
ate. They contradict our rejection of the Madisonian limit on 
Congress's ends, and they are unnecessary to maintain our adher-
ence to the Madisonian insistence that national power is limited 
power. 
